# Is Rosatom's Myanmar SMR Project Actually Moving Forward?

[Rosatom State Nuclear Energy Corporation](https://smrintel.com/companies/rosatom) expects to sign a contract for initial engineering surveys in Myanmar before the end of 2026, with physical site work scheduled to begin in 2027 — a timeline that Director General Alexei Likhachev described as "essentially the start of construction." The project centers on a two-unit, 110 MWe installation using RITM-200N pressurised water reactors rated at 55 MWe each, adapted from the RITM-200 reactors that power Russia's nuclear icebreaker fleet. An intergovernmental agreement covering this project was signed during a state visit to Russia in March 2025, and Myanmar President Min Aung Hlaing's official visit to Moscow last week produced fresh political momentum, with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin publicly endorsing the project's strategic significance.

The project carries an option to expand to 330 MW capacity through additional units. For a country with Myanmar's grid constraints and political isolation from Western capital markets, a modular, factory-derived reactor design that does not require HALEU fuel or novel regulatory frameworks carries real practical appeal — even as it raises distinct geopolitical complications for the broader SMR export market.

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## What the RITM-200N Brings to the Table

The RITM-200N is the land-based derivative of the RITM-200, a compact pressurised water reactor design with operational heritage in Russia's Arctic icebreaker program. That heritage matters: the icebreaker application demanded high reliability, compact footprint, and the ability to operate with limited external support infrastructure — characteristics that translate directly to remote or grid-constrained deployment contexts.

At 55 MWe per unit, the RITM-200N sits at the smaller end of the SMR spectrum, below the output class of designs like [Rolls-Royce SMR Ltd](https://smrintel.com/companies/rolls-royce-smr)'s 470 MWe module or [GE Vernova / GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy](https://smrintel.com/companies/ge-vernova)'s BWRX-300. That smaller footprint reduces per-unit capital outlay and construction complexity, which is an advantage in a market where financing and construction capability are both constrained. The two-unit initial configuration reaching 110 MWe is large enough to function as genuine [baseload power](https://smrintel.com/glossary/baseload) for a regional grid segment, while the 330 MW expansion path offers a credible scaling trajectory.

Likhachev's framing — "we've signed an intergovernmental agreement, and now we have a comprehensive contractual framework and are about to enter the site" — aligns with Rosatom's standard project sequencing: intergovernmental agreement, then general contract, then engineering surveys, then site preparation. The engineering survey contract expected by year-end would formally initiate that on-the-ground phase.

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## Rosatom's Land-Based SMR Track Record

The Myanmar announcement does not exist in isolation. Russia already has a land-based SMR under construction and a sea-based floating nuclear power plant operating. Earlier in 2026, a concrete-pouring ceremony was held for the first of two Russian SMR units in Uzbekistan — providing a direct precedent for the RITM-200N export model that Rosatom can point to in client discussions.

That Uzbekistan project represents Rosatom's [first of a kind (FOAK)](https://smrintel.com/glossary/foak) land-based SMR export execution, and its construction progress directly de-risks the Myanmar timeline in Rosatom's commercial narrative. Whether the Uzbekistan schedule holds, and what the actual construction cost trajectory looks like, will be closely watched by every other potential RITM-200N customer.

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## The Geopolitical Dimension Western Developers Can't Ignore

Myanmar's current government — the military junta led by President Min Aung Hlaing — is under broad Western sanctions following the 2021 coup. That political reality effectively forecloses participation by US, European, or South Korean reactor vendors, who face both regulatory restrictions on technology transfer and reputational exposure with investors and offtake counterparties.

This is precisely the market segment where Rosatom's state-backed, sanctions-resilient model operates with structural advantage. Western SMR developers targeting Southeast Asia — including potential future entrants from the US, UK, or South Korea — have no near-term path into Myanmar regardless of technical merit.

The broader industry implication is sharper than it first appears: geopolitical fragmentation is actively sorting the global SMR export market into distinct lanes. Countries outside Western alliance structures or under sanctions are becoming a de facto Rosatom and, increasingly, Chinese vendor domain. The [China National Nuclear Corporation](https://smrintel.com/companies/cnnc) is pursuing its own SMR export agenda in parallel, and the Myanmar precedent reinforces that a meaningful share of global SMR demand will be contested in markets where Western developers simply cannot compete on current policy grounds.

For US and European developers, this is not just a missed revenue opportunity — it shapes long-term reference plant counts, which directly affect NOAK cost projections and investor confidence in eventual LCOE competitiveness.

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## What Comes Next

The immediate milestone to watch is the engineering survey contract signature, which Rosatom expects before the end of 2026. That contract will trigger physical mobilization and geological assessment at the selected Myanmar site — details not yet disclosed in available source material. Site characterization findings will inform the formal construction permit pathway under Myanmar's regulatory framework, which itself is nascent and will likely require substantial Russian technical assistance to operationalize.

The 2027 site work start, if it holds, would put Myanmar on a construction timeline that — based on analogous projects — would target grid connection sometime in the early-to-mid 2030s. Slippage at the engineering survey stage is common in greenfield nuclear projects in countries without established regulatory infrastructure, and that risk should be priced into any timeline assessment.

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## Key Takeaways

- Rosatom expects to sign Myanmar engineering survey contracts by end-2026, with site work beginning 2027 — DG Likhachev called this "essentially the start of construction."
- The project uses two RITM-200N PWRs at 55 MWe each, for an initial 110 MWe capacity with an option to expand to 330 MW.
- The RITM-200N is adapted from the RITM-200 used in Russia's nuclear icebreaker fleet, giving it operational heritage in demanding, infrastructure-limited environments.
- The intergovernmental agreement underpinning the project was signed in March 2025; Myanmar President Min Aung Hlaing's August 2026 Moscow visit produced the current progress update.
- Rosatom already has a land-based SMR under construction and a sea-based one operating; the Uzbekistan land-based SMR export (concrete poured earlier in 2026) is the closest precedent.
- Western and South Korean SMR vendors have no viable path into Myanmar under current sanctions regimes, effectively ceding this market to Rosatom and Chinese vendors.

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## Frequently Asked Questions

**What reactor design is Rosatom using for the Myanmar SMR project?**
Rosatom has specified the RITM-200N pressurised water reactor, a land-based adaptation of the RITM-200 used on Russia's nuclear icebreaker fleet. Each unit has a capacity of 55 MWe, and the initial Myanmar deployment covers two units for a combined 110 MWe, with an option to expand to 330 MW.

**When will construction begin on the Myanmar SMR?**
Rosatom Director General Alexei Likhachev indicated that an engineering survey contract should be signed by end-2026, with site work beginning in 2027. Rosatom characterized this phase as essentially the start of construction, though formal construction of the reactor plant itself typically follows site characterization and regulatory approvals.

**What is the legal basis for the Myanmar SMR project?**
An intergovernmental agreement between Russia and Myanmar was signed during a state visit to Russia in March 2025, covering cooperation on the 110 MWe two-unit project. Rosatom subsequently described a "comprehensive contractual framework" as being in place as of August 2026.

**Does Rosatom have experience building land-based SMRs?**
Yes. Russia has a land-based SMR under construction and a sea-based floating nuclear power plant already operating. Additionally, a concrete-pouring ceremony for the first of two RITM-200N units in Uzbekistan was held earlier in 2026, making that project the closest analogous export reference case.

**Why aren't Western SMR developers competing for the Myanmar project?**
Myanmar's military government has been subject to broad Western sanctions since the 2021 coup. US, European, and South Korean reactor vendors face both legal restrictions on technology transfer to sanctioned entities and significant reputational exposure, effectively removing them from competition in this specific market regardless of technical capability.